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SIX AMAZING YEARS
RAGs, NATOPS, and More
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In the early 1950s the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps were suffering near-catastrophicaccident rates. In 1954 alone the Navy/Marine Corps accident rate was almost
fifty-five major mishaps per hundred thousand flight hours, meaning that 776
aircraft and 535 aviators were lost. This was unsustainable. Two British inven-
tions, the angled flight deck and the optical landing system, ameliorated the
problems of flying jet aircraft at sea, but widespread safety problems persisted,
not only in carrier operations but in shore-based operations as well. It was ap-
parent that beyond carrier modifications and other technological fixes, there
were institutional changes that needed to be made. This article chronicles sev-
eral of these changes at a critical period in the service’s history.
Between the start of 1958 and the end of 1963 the Navy and Marines logged a
remarkable achievement in aviation safety. In a period of only six years that in-
cluded intensive operations with some of the most difficult aircraft in the
fleet—Crusaders, Demons, Skyrays, Tigers, Phantoms, Vigilantes, and
Skywarriors—the Navy-wide major mishap rate was reduced by more than half
and was launched on a downward trajectory that continues to this day.1 In those
six years were established replacement air group
(RAG) training, a system of “level readiness,” a Naval
Aviation Training and Operations Procedures Stan-
dardization (NATOPS) program, an improved system
for selection and assignment of personnel, a more re-
sponsive system for maintenance and supply support,
and more. Several of these programs go hand in glove
and need to be discussed together.
Vice Admiral Dunn’s last active-duty assignment was as
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare. He
is a carrier pilot with combat service over North Viet-
nam. His first flag assignment was Commander, Naval
Safety Center, in Norfolk, Virginia. This article is a
product of his yearlong effort as a Ramsey Fellow at the
Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, where he investi-
gated the history of Naval Aviation safety, 1950–2000.
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REPLACEMENT AIR GROUP TRAINING
Replacement training was the first of the concepts developed in that six-year pe-
riod, but once adopted it led into others, especially level readiness and NATOPS.
Formerly, before replacement training was institutionalized, newly desig-
nated aviators or those being reassigned from other duty had reported directly
to fleet squadrons, usually while the squadrons were between deployment re-
group and “workup” status. It was up to the squadron to check out the “nugget,”
or “newbie,” in whatever aircraft the squadron happened to be flying. For avia-
tors who had flown similar aircraft in the training command or at previous duty
stations, there was no great difficulty; however, those going to jet squadrons who
had never before flown a jet had a real problem. In some ways it was even harder
for the more senior pilots, likely to be coming from shipboard or shore duty
where they had flown little but twin-engine Beech SNB-5s four hours each
month, to maintain general proficiency and qualifications; they were now ex-
pected not only to master a new kind of airplane but to lead as well.
A related issue particularly pertinent to carrier squadrons manifested itself
when, later in the training cycle, it was time to work at the scale of an air group
—that is, the aviation units that would be assigned, under an overall commander,
to an aircraft carrier. Normally, there were no more than casual exchanges among
the squadrons within an air group. This was a special problem with the “air task
groups”2 left over from the Korean War and with the various detachments needed
to flesh out an air group’s capabilities.3 Leaders did not know one another, and ju-
nior pilots did not know the senior officers of other squadrons or on the air group
staff. No one knew much about working with other types of aircraft in the air, as
they would have to once air-group operations began—usually during workups at
the naval air stations at, say, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba) or Fallon (Nevada), or upon
embarkation on board the assigned carrier.4
A third group of issues for carrier air groups had to do with specialty training,
maintenance, and supply. Except for air task groups an attempt was made to base
all squadrons of an air group at the same naval air station in order to facilitate air
group command and control, but the resulting need to distribute such facilities
among several air stations exacerbated problems of training, maintenance, and
supply generally. For example, if each air group had a squadron of F9F-6 Cou-
gars, a squadron of F9F-5 Panthers, another of FJ-4 Furies, and one of AD
Skyraiders, each host naval air station had to maintain the aircraft simulators
and a fleet air support squadron (FASRON).5 The same applied to the aviation
supply office at each naval air station. For instrument training, pilots often had
to be sent away to other stations on temporary duty, at great expense in money
and time. Thus, for carrier squadrons on the West Coast, services had to be du-
plicated at NAS (Naval Air Station) Alameda, Miramar, Moffett Field, and North
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Island, California, and on the East Coast at NAS Oceana and Norfolk (in Vir-
ginia), and Cecil Field, Jacksonville, and Key West (in Florida).6 Not only did
such a system place unneeded demands on test equipment and highly trained
maintainers and stretch the spare-parts inventories in the supply system, but it
was also expensive and terribly wasteful of manpower and did little to enhance
either readiness or safety.
By the late 1950s the situation cried out for some sort of consolidation, and the
Navy found models in its own backyard. In World War II, a pilot ordered to an air
group would first go through an Advanced Carrier Training Group, where he
mastered the plane he would fly before he reached the carrier. In other words, he
was combat ready when he reported to his squadron.7 That process was dropped
soon after the war ended, but the idea remained in institutional memory.
As early as May 1952, the commander of the Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet had
established the Fleet Air Gunnery Unit (FAGU) at NAS El Centro, California.8 At-
lantic Fleet squadrons took advantage of FAGU’s training some years later, estab-
lishing in effect a Navy-wide system of gunnery, bombing, and ordnance-system
maintenance.
In the Naval Air Training Command too, instructors were already receiving
standardized preparation, in special instructors’ schools, before ever taking on a
student; one was the Instructors’ Basic Training Unit in Pensacola, Florida. In
April 1955 the Jet Transitional Training Unit (JTTU) had been established at
Olathe, Kansas, to orient erstwhile deskbound pilots to jets.9
Even earlier, with the arrival of even more demanding jet aircraft into the
fleet, Vice Admiral William Martin, then Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific
Fleet, directed that Commander James D. “Jig Dog” Ramage, commanding offi-
cer of Composite Squadron 3 (VC-3) at Moffett Field, establish a transitional
training unit there to train both pilots and maintenance personnel in standard-
ized procedures for operating and maintaining the high-performance aircraft
then entering the fleet. Project CHECKOUT (then colloquially “Cougar College”)
was organized to train for the swept-wing F9F-6 and later the FJ-4; it was com-
bined later with Project CUTLASS to set up training for the F7U.10 Training for
the Douglas A-4D Skyhawk, the Demon, and the Skyray followed.11
With these examples before them, it was easy for planners to visualize the es-
tablishment of replacement training squadrons, starting with replacement
training air groups—or “RAGs,” as they have long been called—and leading ul-
timately to the graduate training program we know today as the RAG system.
A catalyst for a replacement training program may have been an 18 December
1957 letter from Vice Admiral Robert Goldthwaite, then Chief of Naval Air
Training (CNATRA), to Vice Admiral William V. Davis, Jr., the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Air Warfare)—that is, “Op-05.” The letter compared the
1 0 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_2011SummerReview_100.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Wednesday, April 20, 2011 10:44:06 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
3
Dunn: Six Amazing Years
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
D U N N 1 0 1
introduction by the U.S. Air Force of its “Century Series” fighters, with its pro-
gram of carefully organized training, and the Navy’s much worse experience
with relatively unsupervised checkout in its own new jets. He went on to suggest
that the CNATRA-supervised training at the JTTU, in Olathe, might be a model
for the Navy. Further, he suggested that the issue be put on the agenda for a Gen-
eral Aviation Training Conference to be held the following February.
Whether Admiral Goldthwaite’s suggested discussion made the agenda or not
is unknown, but on 10 March 1958 the Chief of Naval Operations approved
a reorganization of carrier aviation that would create uniform air groups, provide a
more permanent group assignment to ships, and permit a reduction of assigned units
and aircraft without also reducing combat readiness. The new organization also pro-
vided for a permanent replacement Air Group to be established on each coast and
made responsible for the indoctrination of key maintenance personnel, the tactical
training of aviators, and conducting special programs required for the introduction
of new models of combat aircraft.12
Hand in hand with the RAG approach, the Navy instituted what was then
known as the “base loading” system. Basically, all aircraft of a given type were
now consolidated at one station on each coast, colocated with the RAG for that
type, thereby facilitating instrument, simulator, and maintenance training, as
well as intermediate maintenance and supply. It also did wonders for tactics, as
pilots met, passed the word, and discussed the best way to carry out missions
—sometimes in semiformal classrooms, sometimes at “Happy Hours” at offi-
cers’ clubs.
About a year later, in May 1959, FASRONs were disestablished. Maintenance
devolved to units having custody of aircraft, although new aircraft intermediate
maintenance departments on carriers and at naval air stations assumed the
FASRONs’ former role.13
The first two replacement air groups were regular carrier air groups, one from
each coast, redesignated in 1958 as RAGs and given new missions.14 One,
CVG-4, sometimes called “CAG-4,” was renamed RCVG-4 and based at NAS
Cecil Field for East Coast carrier squadrons.15 The other, CVG-12 (or
“CAG-12”), at NAS Miramar, became the West Coast training group.16 Later, in
April 1962, to bring their generic titles in line with their functions, RAGs were
categorized as “combat readiness air groups” (CRAGs)—though they were still
referred to individually as RCVGs (e.g., RCVG-4).17 Many of the squadrons as-
signed to them retained their original names and numbers, but the RCVGs even-
tually absorbed a mixture of squadrons and aircraft types, with new training
missions. RAG squadrons dedicated to instrument training were also estab-
lished to train and refresh pilots in instrument work, using two-place aircraft,
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and to administer the required written examinations. Early on, FAGU was ab-
sorbed into the RAGs. At the outset, though the RCVG commanders and their
staffs were in Cecil Field and Miramar, their squadrons were distributed among
Oceana, Jacksonville, Cecil Field, and Key West on the East Coast and Alameda,
Moffett Field, and Miramar on the west. On the Marine Corps side, Marine
Training Squadron 1 (VMT-1) was established at Marine Corps Air Station
(MCAS) Cherry Point, North Carolina, in July 1958, with a three-element cur-
riculum: a Swept-Wing Jet Transitional and Refresher Course and two instru-
ment courses. There was a similar organization at MCAS El Toro, California, for
West Coast Marines. Later, replacement patrol air wings were established, espe-
cially important as the maritime patrol (VP) community began its transition to
the P-3 Orion aircraft. Sometime later, RAGs were established on both coasts for
heavy attack, reconnaissance attack, airborne early warning (the E-1 Tracer and
E-2 Hawkeye), and helicopters. Today we have RAGs for each major type of air-
craft and mission in the inventory. Still later, the two RCVG commanders and
staffs were seen as redundant and replaced by other supervisory organizations.
RAGs not only familiarized and trained newly reported pilots, and soon naval
flight officers (or NFOs, specializing in weapon and sensor systems), in the sys-
tems and flight characteristics of their new aircraft but also trained enlisted
maintenance personnel in the particulars of their aircraft. The latter took the
place of the former on-the-job training provided recent graduates of specialized
technical training activities (known as “A” and “B” schools) by fleet squadrons
and FASRONs, thus simultaneously improving maintenance readiness and re-
ducing costs.
Most importantly, the RAGs had a tremendously positive influence on acci-
dent prevention.
July 1959 marked the end of the first year of Replacement Carrier Air Group opera-
tion. RCVG-trained pilots represented 28 percent of the average number of fleet pi-
lots flying A4D, F4D, F11F, F3H, FJ-4 and F8U aircraft during fiscal year 1959.
A study of their safety record as opposed to squadron trained pilots showed only 1 in
24 RCVG trained pilots were involved in a pilot factor accident as contrasted to 1 in 9
for squadron trained pilots.
The RCVG program was estimated to have saved the Navy approximately 40 million
dollars to date [1959].18
LEVEL READINESS
RAGs also facilitated readiness. Previously, as noted, squadrons would reconsti-
tute between deployments. The more experienced pilots would depart for other
duty soon after a cruise, to be replaced by a combination of pilots from shore
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duty and “nuggets” directly from the training command. It was up to the squad-
ron leadership to mold this new group into a cohesive and talented fighting unit.
As expected, results were mixed, depending almost solely on the leadership (or
lack of it) of the commanding officer, executive officer, and operations officer.
“Level readiness” was a response to this unevenness: the RAG would train the re-
placement pilots, and later NFOs, making them ready to blend in with any
squadron flying similar aircraft without any further indoctrination. Squadrons
would not be totally reconstituted between cruises but have individuals rotate in
and out in accordance with optimum career planning and the needs of the ser-
vice. The theory was that every two months, each fleet squadron, regardless of
where it might be in a deployment cycle, would lose one full-tour pilot and gain
a replacement pilot of equivalent rank. In this way the squadron would maintain
continually its level of combat readiness.19
The Atlantic Fleet adopted the practice of level readiness, but the Pacific Fleet
did not, and even in the Atlantic Fleet not everyone was happy with the arrange-
ment. Among other things, there was suspicion that it was simply a scheme con-
cocted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel to stretch limited personnel resources.
Squadron commanding officers objected to losing experienced pilots in the
middle of a deployment, to be replaced by unknown quantities.20 Some years
later the level-readiness concept was somewhat modified to enable squadrons
about to deploy to work up as units with all personnel on board. Yet level readi-
ness paid off any number of times, even in the Pacific Fleet, when an individual
lost to accident or in combat had to be replaced on short notice and the RAG sys-
tem was able to do that.
NATOPS
As the RAGs got started, familiar questions about what the best way was to do
certain things emerged with new urgency. At first, as had been the case in squad-
rons before RAGs, operations officers or commanding officers of RAG squad-
rons dictated as they thought best. Soon, however, after a few exchanges between
coasts, it became obvious that there had to be one best way. Thus came the first
glimmers of standardization. Eventually they led to what is known today as
NATOPS, Naval Aviation Training and Operations Procedures Standardization.
How that happened and why is quite a story.
In 2010 a retired Marine aviator recalled how it had been before NATOPS
—in his case, in 1956.
What the flying did not include in those days was a fully-fledged standardization pro-
gram and a mature Naval Aviation Safety program. The result, predictably obvious
by today’s standards, was a horrific accident rate.21 You see, the folks who led us back
then were all wily, steely-eyed veterans of World War II and Korea and knew no fear.
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They trained us the same way they had been trained—by launching us into the hos-
tile sky largely unsupervised with the hope that the more promising among us would
return alive. Surprisingly, some of us did. It was a training system Charles Darwin
would have been proud of.22
While the remark about merely hoping that “nuggets” would stay alive might
be an exaggeration, it is true that there was little supervision. Orientation to fleet
aircraft often consisted of a reading of the handbook, a blindfold cockpit check,
a brief on how to start the engine, and a “good luck.” More than one novice was
told something like, “Meet me over the San Mateo Bridge at 5,000 feet,” only to
find that the rendezvous was for an air-to-air test of his skill and mettle.
Not all was chaos before NATOPS, however. Standardization was the rule in
many aspects of Naval Aviation. In the training command, students preflighted,
started, taxied, and flew their training aircraft in standard ways. Takeoff proce-
dures, landing approach patterns, and flight procedures—including a variety of
maneuvers, both acrobatic and nonacrobatic—were performed according to
strict standards. Flight grades were predicated on those standards. Instructors,
as we have seen, were prepared in standardized ways.
Then there was instrument flight training, but before 1950, not all Naval Avi-
ators were qualified to fly on instruments, only those with special training. Ev-
eryone else flew according to visual flight rules. With increased emphasis on
flying at night and growing need for flying near high-traffic metropolitan areas
and in airways, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that instrument flight
boards be established at each squadron, air group, and station and that by the
middle of 1952 all Naval Aviators have and maintain valid instrument ratings.23
That, of course, required increased training in instrument flying and airways
procedures, which was in itself a kind of standardization. Much of that learn-
ing and subsequent practice was codified in the All-Weather Flight Manual, a
sort of precursor to NATOPS for flying at night and in bad weather on
instruments.
Meanwhile, in the training command and in the fleet, takeoff and landing
patterns had long been standardized. Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots flew
identical patterns at airfields, and all aircraft carriers had the same launch and
landing pattern. In fact, there was a United States Fleet directive, and later a Na-
val Warfare Publication (NWP), that stipulated the patterns. Also, in the fleet,
each organization had a standard operating procedure (SOP), important if for
no other reason than it was on the checklist for every administrative inspection.
The problem was that even if the squadron followed it, the SOP changed ev-
ery time the commanding officer or the operations officer changed. At the same
time, lurking in the background and impeding progress toward standardization
generally, was the question, “Why standardize and shut down initiative?” It
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seemed to one observer at the time, “Some people view the idea of everyone in
Naval Aviation doing everything, ‘the one best way’ with some misgivings. They
fear that general use of standardized procedures, while it may reduce the acci-
dent rate, will result in a reduction of a pilot’s ability ‘to think on his feet’ and
deal flexibly with emergencies and combat situations.”24
That is, standardization was not necessarily looked upon as a safety factor. Af-
ter all, all the Navy’s propeller-driven aircraft were so similar in cockpit configu-
ration that an experienced pilot could easily step from one type to another
without any special training, and many did. Even going from single-engine to
multiengine was not especially hard. Every cockpit had a stick (or a yoke), a
throttle (or two or four), propeller and mixture control(s), magneto switches,
perhaps a supercharger lever, flaps, and landing-gear controls. All these were in
similar positions in every aircraft; the only thing an experienced pilot needed to
learn to fly a new airplane was how to start it and what airspeeds were recom-
mended for maneuvers and landing. Tactics varied from fighters to bombers to
patrol and transport, but that did not matter to people who cared only about the
flying. Then came the jets.
The first jets were not much different from reciprocating-engine, propeller-
driven aircraft. Of course, the takeoff roll was longer, engine response to throttle
movement was quite a bit more sluggish, fuel was used up a lot quicker, and
there was less time to correct a bad landing approach, but then, that messy throt-
tle quadrant—with mixture, prop, and supercharger levers—was gone, and
there were no magnetos. Problems began to develop only when older pilots tried
flying jets with habits they had picked up in “props,” jets began flying from ships,
and even-higher-performance jets, with new capabilities, came along. It was
then, with fleet accident rates at a new high, that perceptive leaders recognized
that something had to be done.
It was natural to look to examples already established—JTTU, “Cougar Col-
lege,” FAGU, and others. Thus even before NATOPS there was a framework for
establishing a methodology to ensure that newly indoctrinated pilots were ex-
posed to the best possible training and procedures, training and procedures that
would improve the mishap performance, and therefore readiness, of all fleet
aircraft.
Still, the Pacific Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, and the Naval Air Training Com-
mand all had different ideas as to what the best system might be. One example,
perhaps apocryphal, was that A-4 pilots from one fleet made approaches with
speed brakes out, in the other with speed brakes in. There was a difference of
opinion as to the best way to recover from a poststall gyration in an F7U Cutlass.
Still other differences abounded as well. At that point Vice Admiral Robert Pirie,
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare)—that is, DCNO (Air),
D U N N 1 0 5
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Op-05—stepped in. Sources vary as to what caused him to act, but act he did,
setting the tone for what NATOPS is today: a manual for the users.25
First, he made the basic decision that there must be one best way to, say, make
an approach in an A-4, recover from a Cutlass poststall gyration, or whatever the
case might be. He put a team together to find, for each situation, that best way.
Second, he had to choose between letting his staff, all experienced aviators, de-
cide the best way and asking the fleet—that is, the current users of the aircraft.
He came down on the side of the current users: they would be the subject-matter
experts, they would write what became NATOPS, and they continue to write and
modify it to this day. Naval Aviators who were actually flying the aircraft in the
fleet, lieutenants and lieutenant commanders, wrote the books, using as a guide
a June 1961 Naval Training Device Center publication, Improvement of Flight
Handbooks. Agreement had to be reached from squadron to squadron and fleet
to fleet and up the chain of command before any NATOPS manual was ap-
proved. Approval came via wing commanders and type commanders (to DCNO
[Air]);26 only after that entire command chain approved did Admiral Pirie and
his successors put their signatures to each volume. The end result was a manual
that stipulated the best method of performing every function in a given aircraft,
thus contributing to safe and efficient flight operations.
All NATOPS manuals were similar in format. Each had eight chapters: “In-
doctrination,” “Shore-Based Procedures,” “Carrier-Based Procedures,” “Flight
Procedures,” “Emergency Procedures,” “Communications,” “Special Mission,”
and “Miscellaneous.” Over the long term, the introductions were probably most
important, because they invited every reader and every user to recommend
changes and modifications. All such inputs were reviewed, and all were consid-
ered, and they still are. Thus, through an iterative process, the best procedures
and practices were distilled, combat readiness and operational effectiveness
were significantly raised, and aircraft accident rates were significantly reduced.
One very experienced Naval Aviator would write, “[NATOPS] is designed as a
means of providing the best and safest aircraft training and operating proce-
dures in an easy to use manual for each type of plane we fly, to enable such a
manual to be attentive to the needs of the operating forces, and to provide a
training tool for Squadron Commanders’ use in determining areas of weakness
in his training program or in an individual.”27
In May 1961 the NATOPS program was adopted and made authoritative by
the Chief of Naval Operations, through the promulgation of OpNav Instruction
3510.9, a series still effective today. Of course, manuals for every aircraft type did
not spring up the day the instruction was signed; it took a great deal of work and
coordination to bring out each one. The helicopter community, with its Sikorsky
HSS-1N Seabat (later the SH-34) NATOPS, was first “out of the chocks,” that
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very same May 1961. Other aircraft types soon followed, and within the year
manuals for forty-seven aircraft had been issued. It was as if everyone had
thought, “It’s about time!” Gone were arguments with newly arrived operations
officers about the “right way.” Down went the mishap rate. Almost everyone
pronounced NATOPS to be “good,” though diehards continued to grumble
about lost opportunities for initiative.
NATOPS continued to develop, of course. In the beginning, NATOPS was just
one of a trilogy of books to be used by Naval Aviators. There were still the Flight
Manual, which had long been around and covered the mechanics of the airplane
—the “systems,” in today’s vernacular; the NWP series, which addressed tactics;
and now NATOPS, covering techniques. In December 1963 an F9F-8T (two-seat
Cougar trainer) manual appeared, consolidating all three; handbook informa-
tion with flight and operating procedures was promulgated. Although its covers
were not blue at first, the “Blue Sleeping Pill” had been born.28 More—many
more—editions were to follow. (There were also, of course, manuals and techni-
cal orders, to which, though they were kept in maintenance spaces, pilots seeking
answers to special problems often referred.) Frequent and regular NATOPS con-
ferences under the auspices of the air type commanders helped to keep the man-
uals current and useful. One of the best summaries of NATOPS available was
published in the August 1961 issue of Approach, the Naval Safety Center’s uni-
versally read aviation safety magazine: “The new NATOPS program was devel-
oped by the users for the users. It will be modified as we go along by these same
individuals. New tricks of the trade will be passed around quickly for expert
evaluation and, if sound, for use by all hands. The end result will be increased
operational readiness through increased safety brought about by improved pilot
techniques.”
An interesting and important milestone on the road to adoption of NATOPS
was cooperation among all the many Navy aviation communities, among fleets,
and with the Air Force. The latter cooperation in particular was remarkable, in
that most Navy people are reluctant to learn anything from their brethren in
light blue. Nevertheless, the Air Force had operated a standardization and evalu-
ation (“Stan/Eval”) program for many years, and the first Navy standardization
evaluators actually took the Air Force course, learned that service’s philosophy
and methodology, and brought them back to the Navy, albeit somewhat modi-
fied. Along with the NATOPS manual came the aforementioned standardization
instructors and evaluators, who visited squadrons to make sure that their nor-
mal flight and emergency procedures were in conformance, systems knowledge
was adequate, and more. The NATOPS framework was implemented quickly,
but its scope broadened gradually, until, type by aircraft type and unit by unit, it
was incorporated in every Navy and Marine squadron and wing, afloat and
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ashore. Later, the system was expanded to landing signal officers and aircraft car-
riers and other aviation ships. NATOPS is used as a teaching guide in ground
school and as a guide for both standard and emergency procedures in simula-
tors, in trainers, and in the air. It is also the common denominator for readiness
across fleets, type commanders, ships, and stations.
{LINE-SPACE}
Today it would be hard to conceive of aviation in the Navy without replacement
air groups and Naval Aviation Training and Operations Procedures Standard-
ization, but in the beginning it was equally hard to conceive that Naval Aviation
could have standardized to such an extent without destroying the spirit of inno-
vation that in fact persists until this day. Nor could it have been conceived that,
thanks largely to farseeing souls who believed that dedicated training and stan-
dardization just might help, the Navy-wide mishap rate could be improved from
1,106 major accidents, 613 destroyed aircraft, and 358 people killed the year be-
fore RAGs were first begun and NATOPS was first considered to only eleven ma-
jor mishaps in 2009. At the same time it is hard to detect any decrease in either
individual or squadron initiative.
Very often, when old-timers are told that today’s accident rate is only about
one every hundred thousand flying hours, they are at first incredulous. Then
they ask, “How? What made the difference?” The answer might be better leader-
ship, better selection, better personnel management, improved integration of
aviation medicine, better aircraft and systems, better maintenance and supply,
angled decks and landing-approach mirrors on carriers, the replacement train-
ing concept, or NATOPS.29 The answer is not singular, all these helped—but cen-
tral among the reasons are most certainly the adoption of the RAG concept and
the implementation and effective use of NATOPS.
These were indeed six amazing years.
NOTE S
1. The Vought F8U Crusader, McDonnell F3H
Demon, Douglas F4D Skyray, Grumman
F11F Tiger, McDonnell F4H Phantom, North
American A5A (later RA-5C) Vigilante, and
the Douglas A3D Skywarrior.
2. In order to fill out the decks of aircraft carri-
ers mobilized during the Korean War, “air
task groups” were formed, taking one squad-
ron from each of several already formed air
groups. For example, Air Task Group 1 con-
sisted of VF-111 from Air Group 11, VF-52
from Air Group 5, VF-151 from Air Group
15, and VF-194 from Air Group 19.
3. Customarily each air group took with it on
deployment detachments of aircraft and per-
sonnel for photo reconnaissance, airborne
early warning, and night and all-weather at-
tack, as well as helicopters.
4. One perhaps extreme example of the difficul-
ties attendant to such an arrangement comes
from the author’s first cruise. The ship had
been to sea about six weeks when a strange
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commander came into the ready room,
looked around, and left. All looked at one an-
other and asked, “Who was that?” It turned
out to have been the air group commander.
5. The FASRON was the intermediate level of
maintenance between overhaul and repair
depots staffed mostly by long-term Navy ci-
vilians and the organizational level staffed by
sailors in each squadron. The FASRON was
manned by both permanent–duty station
Navy personnel and specialists on temporary
duty from parent squadrons. When the
squadron deployed its FASRON-assigned
personnel would rejoin the squadron. The
FASRON owned difficult-to-transport test
equipment and repair benches, expensive
spares, and, often, spare aircraft.
6. Marines apparently had fewer problems, be-
ing based primarily at Cherry Point, North
Carolina, and El Toro, California.
7. “A Revolution in Readiness,” Naval Aviation
News, January 1959, pp. 7–11.
8. A six-week course at El Centro for Navy and
Marine fighter and attack squadrons was
meant to establish a cadre of excellence in
ordnance and gunnery within each squadron.
Established initially for West Coast squad-
rons, it expanded later to offer training to
those on the East Coast as well.
9. Roy A. Grossnick, United States Naval Avia-
tion, 1910–1995 (Washington, D.C.: Naval
Historical Center, 1997), p. 206.
10. “Supersonic Checkout,” Naval Aviation
News, April 1955, pp. 1–5.
11. “Crusader College Carries On,” Naval Avia-
tion News, June 1958, pp. 22–23. VF(AW)-3,
formerly VC-3, had actually operated as a
transitional training unit since 1954. Initially
it was a small unit at Moffett Field, Califor-
nia, operating under the aegis of the Naval
Air Test Center as an adjunct to a fleet indoc-
trination program for new aircraft. At first,
four pilots from each transitioning squadron
completed a forty-hour flight syllabus at
VF(AW)-3 in all phases of flight. Later a
cadre of enlisted maintenance people was
added, the idea being that, for each squadron,
the four pilots and the small group of
maintainers would form the core of a train-
ing effort. Ramage took command in 1955
just as the squadron began training with the
Cutlass.
12. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation,
1910–1995 (as republished in Roy A.
Grossnick, Dictionary of American Naval Avi-
ation Squadrons [Washington, D.C.: Naval
Historical Center, 1997], vol. 2, CD-ROM).
13. Grossnick, Dictionary of American Naval Avi-
ation Squadrons.
14. For the Atlantic Fleet, the mission of Carrier
Air Group 4 was defined as the indoctrina-
tion, familiarization, and basic training of
Naval Aviators and key maintenance person-
nel, as well as the establishment of fleet intro-
duction programs for new models of carrier
combat aircraft. For Pacific Fleet squadrons,
the mission was to provide indoctrination
and flight training to fleet replacement pilots,
as well as indoctrination and on-the-job
training for replacement enlisted personnel.
15. The original RCVG-4 squadrons were
VF-101, VF-174, VF-21, VA-44, and VF-22.
16. The original RCVG-12 squadrons were
VF-121, VF-124, VA-125, and VA-126.
17. Grossnick, Dictionary of American Naval Avi-
ation Squadrons.
18. Approach, August 1959. Referring to the A4D
(later A-4D) Skyhawk.
19. Capt. R. G. Dosé, USN, “Professional Note:
The Replacement Air Group Concept,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings (April 1960), pp.
135–38.
20. Donald D. Engen, Wings and Warriors: My
Life as a Naval Aviator (Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution, 1997), pp. 236–37.
21. The fiscal year 1956 Navy-Marine accident
rate was 33.5 major accidents for each hun-
dred thousand hours flown, with 574 aircraft
destroyed and 406 people killed.
22. Col. William T. Hewes, USMC (Ret.), “The
High Dive,” Naval Aviation Museum Foun-
dation 31, no. 1 (Spring 2010), p. 96. For an-
other look at generally the same experience,
see Robert C. Rubel, “The U.S. Navy’s Tran-
sition to Jets,” Naval War College Review 63,
no. 2 (Spring 2010), pp. 49–59.
23. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation,
1910–1995, p. 188.
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24. “The One Best Way: A New Standard for
Navy Air,” Naval Aviation News, August
1961, p. 6, available at www.history.navy.mil/.
25. In his Aircraft Carriers at War (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007), Adm.
James L. Holloway III, who had been execu-
tive assistant to Vice Admiral Pirie, gives his
version (pp. 149–51). Vice Adm. Donald
Engen, an air wing commander at the time of
NATOPS introduction, gives a different view
in his Wings and Warriors, p. 245.
26. Air wing commanders oversee the training,
manning, maintenance, and administration
of groups of squadrons of mixed types that, at
least ideally, embark together on aircraft car-
riers. Type commanders performed the same
functions for all naval aircraft in the Atlantic
or Pacific Fleet (today combined in one head-
quarters in San Diego, California).
27. Approach, October 1962; quoting Captain R.
J. Selmer, Commander, Fleet Air, Alameda,
California.
28. Today’s manuals are thick volumes, some
even produced in more that one volume for a
single aircraft type, but all characterized by
blue covers. There is so much material that
anyone attempting to read the whole book
from cover to cover in one sitting would be
prone to falling asleep—thus, “Blue Sleeping
Pill.”
29. For the introduction of the angled flight deck
and mirror landing aid, see Thomas C. Hone,
Norman Friedman, and Mark C. Mandeles,
“The Development of the Angled-Deck Air-
craft Carrier: Innovation and Adaptation,”
Naval War College Review 64, no. 2 (Spring
2011), pp. 63–78, available at www.usnwc
.edu/press/.
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